



Safety not guaranteed:

Using formal methods in human factors engineering

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Safety and simulation

- ▶ Safety-critical systems: our lives and safety depend on them
- ▶ More specifically, on their correctness and robustness (among other attributes)
- ▶ Size and complexity concerns
- ▶ The use of simulation

Safety and simulation

▶ Why simulate?


- Cost-effective (comparatively)
- Useful event traces
- Scalable
- Diverse scenario exploration

▶ Why not simulate?


Formal Methods

- ▶ Formal methods: collections of tools and techniques to prove (*guarantee*) a system will perform as intended


- Modeling
- Specification
- Verification




Formal Methods




Formal Methods



Formal Methods



Formal Methods



Simulation and Formal Methods

Simulations are better at...

- ▶ Scalable computability
- ▶ Large-scope, scenario exploration
- ▶ Producing diverse performance and/or stochastic measures of system performance


Formal methods are better at ...

- ▶ Complete state-space evaluation
- ▶ Small-scope, area of interest exploration
- ▶ Making specific guarantees about system model behavior or finding specific (potential unusual) occurrences of system conditions

Current Research

- ▶ Working with Georgia Tech, Honeywell, and Drexel U, sponsored by NASA
- ▶ Our slice: Using formal methods to do sensitivity analysis on simulation scenarios for evaluating authority and autonomy in NextGen Air Traffic Control

WMC Simulation Scenario



Current Research

- ▶ Modeling WMC concepts in SAL to facilitate WMC ↔ SAL scenario translations
 - Agents, a series of actions the agents must perform, a scheduler to arrange incoming actions, and flight “resources” (ex: altitude, speed)
- ▶ Developing formal specification properties capable of finding interesting authority and autonomy conditions in air traffic scenarios:
 - Authority-responsibility double-bind
 - Multistep action interruptions
 - Clumsy automation / bad function allocation
 - Excessive human task load

Conclusions and Future Work

- ▶ Automated translation: SAL \leftrightarrow WMC
 - ▶ Examining real-world scenarios, backfeed into WMC
 - ▶ Applications to novel scenarios at previously-unexplored levels of rigor
 - ▶ Adam's interests: autonomy, authority and responsibility;
dynamic function allocation;
trust (guarantees?) in automation.
- Formal Methods

Fin.

- ▶ References upon request.
- ▶ Constructive commentary and questions to:

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Thanks for listening!

Additional Slides



